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BAR BRIEFS
mon. There will not be unity of time or unity of title, because the
husband's interests arises by virtue of his grantor's conveyance,
and the wife's interest by virtue of her grantor's conveyance to
her, but if they receive title by the same deed, and section 5265 of
the N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), prevents their receiving a
joint tenancy, they cannot convey a joint tenancy to themselves,
for the same reasons that an individual cannot convey to himself.
2. If the homestead is in the husband's name, he cannot
convey to himself and wife as joint tenants, because unity of time
and interest will be lacking. See: N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913)
§ 5262 quoted above. The unity will be lacking because he gets
his title through the conveyance to him by his grantor. She gets
her interest by virtue of the homestead statute and her husband's
conveyance to her, which must of necessity be subsequent. The
grant by the husband to himself and wife does not operate to vest
any interest in him. It does, however, under some of the above
holdings operate to pass some estate to her, although not the one
intended.
3. What has been said under "2" above is equally true where
the property is not a homestead. It is the writer's opinion that
being or not being a homestead is immaterial to the problem here
involved, particularly since the homestead laws of this state treat
husband and wife alike.
Is it necessary to convey to a third party and have them
convey back to husband and wife. to achieve the desired result
i the above mentioned situations? Husband and wife can convey to each other. It is questionable whether either can convey
to himself or herself, or whether both together can convey to
themselves. While the weight of authority, at least numerically
speaking, permits direct conveyancing, there is strong authority
to the contrary. Oregon, Tennessee, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, perhaps others, do not permit the intention of the grantor
in such case to prevail. North Dakota has not the benefit of a
statute authorizing such direct conveyancing. It seems to the
writer that the only safe way is to convey through a third party
until the North Dakota court passes upon the proposition, or until the legislature authorizes a man to convey to himself or to himshelf and another jointly.
CYRUS N. LYCHE,
Third Year Law Student.
APPEAL TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE
PRACTICING BAR
The impact of the war will inevitably produce vast and profound, if not revolutionary changes in our economic and political
arrangements, putting in jeopardy our democratic way of life.
The ominous shadow of these changes that press upon us, due to
the ascendancy of Force in so large a part of the world, gives rise
to the question: What can we do about it? More particularly:
What can the lawyer, as a lawyer, do about it? That leads to the
deeper question of the role of Law in the successful functioning
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of the democratic process. For if democratic institutions and
procedures are to survive the increasing pressures of this new and
changing world, they must meet the pragmatic test-they must
do the job.
Democracy is possible only to the extent that people are
willing to play the game according to the rules, without resort to
violence to settle their disputes. That presupposes an abiding
faith in the justice and efficacy of peaceful methods of adjustment. The final arbiter is a verdict expressed at the polls. But
in their bearing on concrete individuals in actual circumstances,
disputes of every kind, great and small, are resolved, in last
analysis, by the courts of the land.
How well are they doing the job? It is time to inquire. It
is time, at this critical juncture, for a continuous, searching
scrutiny of the actual, day-to-day operation of the judicial process.
It is time, too, for an examination of conscience by the practicing
bar; for 'awyers representing clients-and their professional attitudes, inclinations and methods-are inseparably a part of the
judicial process. And this points the way for the lawyer's contribution-for the contribution of the lawyer as a lawyer-now
and in the troubled times'ahead.
Are there better ways of choosing judges?
Meantime, and under whatever system of selection, judicial
functions must be so organized and coordinated as to bring judicial energies to bear with maximum effectiveness. How can this
best be accomplished? How far can it be accomplished by exercise of the rule-making power without injury to the democratic
values and processes it is our purpose to conserve?
In particular it is urgently required to revise, and, indeed, to
repudiate and cast off our complacent acceptance of the phoney
justice ground out by so many so-called minor courts. Because
they deal with small sums and petty offenses, these courts are
widely supposed not to matter much. In point of fact, their extensive and intimate contact with great numbers of people, for
whom they symbolize the Law, gives them a paramount importance.
Here, then, is the lawyer's opportunity-to bring to bear on
these problems his special competence and all his ingenuity. It
is more than an opportunity; it is a professional duty--an obligation made even more urgent by the mad course of events. For if
faith in orderly procedures is to live through the ordeals confronting us, the results of those procedures must square with justice
expectations.
Much has been accomplished in the recent past. Means and
measures for further" progress are at hand, waiting to be availed
of. Many, of these are included in the program adopted by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1938.
What is required is a wider, keener appreciation of the urgency of
the case; a better understanding by more lawyers of the proposals
that have been advanced to meet the necessities of the situation,
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and of the experience with those proposals where they have been
tried; and, more than all, the will to meet the issue.
To that end, in every state and city, the organized bar should
sponsor organized study and discussion of the actual workings of
the Law, of the causes of popular dissatisfaction, of the possibilities of improvement; and so activate the profession, arouse it
to a full sense of its responsibilities and spur it on to do what
must be done. Not sometime, now; for the sands run out.
As the Chief Justice has recently admonished: "You can not
maintain democratic institutions by mere forms of words, or by
occasional patriotic vows. You maintain them by making the institutions of our Republic work as they are intended to work.
Here lies your responsibility with respect to this sphere of democratic action in translating the law of the land into the decision of
particular controversies so that every citizen may be assured of
equal justice according to law."
By JOSEPH O'MEARA, JR.*
Journal of the American Judicature Society.
*Of the Cincinnati Bar.

OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In William Martin, Pltf. and Respt., vs. F. L. Anders, Receiver of the
Lucky Strike Coal Company, a Corporation, Deft. and Applt. Henry Hecht,
Pltf. and Respt., vs. F. L. Anders, Receiver of the Lucky Strike Coal Company, a Corporation, Deft. and Applt.
That a judgment which has been entered against a defendant
who has had no opportunity to present his casel on the merits, will be set
aside. (Martin v. Anders.)
That the evidence is examined and it is held: the finding of fact of the trial
court that plaintiff had received no payment on account of wages earned
while working for the defendant is contrary to the evidence. Evidence shows
that plaintiff received $145.50 on account of such wages and defendant should
have been allowed credit in that amount upon the $199.50 which was found to
be the total amount earned by the plaintiff. The judgment is modified accordingly. (Hecht v. Anders.)
Appeal from the District Court of Mercer County, Hon. H. L. Berry.
Judge.
Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
Martin v. Anders, REVERSED.
Hecht v. Anders, MODIIED AND AFFIRMED.
In E. Delafield Smith, Pltf. and Applt., v. Victor Hanson, et a], Defts. and
Respts.
That a statement in a return on an execution that the reason for returning the same wholly unsatisfied is that the property levied upon was mortgaged and that the judgment creditor failed on demand to furnish security
or bond for the sale of such property, does not estop the officer who made
the return, under proper pleading, from showing in addition to the ground
stated in the return for returning the execution unsatisfied (1) that the
judgment creditor failed o advance moneys required to pay the cost of printing the notice of execution sale, upon the demand of the officer that such
moneys be advanced; and, or, (2) that the judgment creditor directed the
officer to abandon the levy and not advertise or sell the property levied upon.
That in absence of statute providing to the contrary, a judgment creditor
at whose instance an execution is issued is entitled to exercise a considerable

